Kögel et al propose a multicriteria alternative to the standard early clinical selection method for xenotransplantation trials. As they note, existing recommendations for inclusion criteria indicate that only the most seriously ill—those lacking any viable alternative—should be considered for xenotransplantation. Rather than basing selection on, to put it indelicately, a Hail Mary in the face of certain death, Kögel et al recommend a selection system based on four ethical criteria: medical need, capacity to benefit, patient choice and compliance (the latter (...) being an exclusion criterion). Taken together, they paint a picture of an ethically ideal first-in-human xenotransplantation clinical trial participant: someone ‘in need of a heart replacement with a good capacity to benefit from a xenotransplantation who [has] a choice in terms of alternative potentially life-sustaining treatment options.’1 In other words, they argue that potential xenotransplantation organ recipients (they specify heart, but said criteria would apply to any vital organ recipient) should not be facing their imminent demise as this would inherently constrain that person’s freedom of choice, thus rendering them vulnerable. Instead, Kögel et al argue that trial participants should be selected from groups possessing genuine alternatives to xenotransplantation but opt to receive an animal organ. Now, their concern regarding the presence of coercion in the context of what is an experimental medical intervention is fully justified, as is their claim that those facing limited viable choices at the end of their lives are an inherently vulnerable population. Autonomy and consent are largely uncontroversial bedrocks on which most medical and research ethics theories are built. We are, all of us, familiar with the horrors from history—both distant and recent—where participant consent has taken …. (shrink)

The article explains a rule-Utilitarian normative thesis about when actions are morally excused; that an act otherwise morally objectionable in some way is excused if a moral system, The acceptance of which in the agent's society would be utility-Maximizing, Would not condemn it. What is meant by a "moral system condemning" an action is explained. The parallel between this moral thesis and the benthamite theory of criminal justice is developed. It is argued that this rule-Utilitarian thesis implies that an action (...) is morally excused (not blameworthy) if it does not manifest a defective trait of character. (shrink)

The relief of suffering is the great goal of medicine. That physicians give up on suffering when they can do nothing about the underlying condition is one of the contemporary criticisms of medicine. Yet even in irremediable suffering there is something noble, to which physicians should attend.

Systems-oriented social epistemology, studies epistemic systems in which individuals work together to determine the epistemic status (true, justified, true beyond a reasonable doubt, e...

This essay demonstrates proof-theoretically the consistency of a type-free theoryC with an unrestricted principle of comprehension and based on a predicate logic in which contraction (A (A B)) (A B), although it cannot holds in general, is provable for a wide range ofA's.C is presented as an axiomatic theoryCH (with a natural-deduction equivalentCS) as a finitary system, without formulas of infinite length. ThenCH is proved simply consistent by passing to a Gentzen-style natural-deduction systemCG that allows countably infinite conjunctions and in (...) which all theorems ofCH are provable.CG is seen to be a consistent by a normalization argument. It also shown that in a senseC is highly non-extensional. (shrink)

I wish to consider what can helpfully be meant by the phrase “rational to believe” as it might appear in the statement “It is rational for the person S in his circumstances at t to place more confidence in p than in q, provided his overriding interest at the time is to place confidence, among any propositions he is considering, in true propositions and not in false ones.” The reference here to the interest of the person is intended to avoid (...) discussing persons for whom it is rational to believe something for extraneous reasons, e.g., for a man to believe his wife is loyal to him irrespective of the evidence. I shall take this term as paradigmatic of “epistemic terms”, examples of which philosophers take to be such terms as “is epistemically justified in believing”, “is warranted in believing”, “is credible”, and so on. I do not claim that all these terms have or should bear the same meaning, but I propose to ignore possible distinctions. (shrink)

Individuals with body integrity identity disorder seek to address a non-delusional incongruity between their body image and their physical embodiment, sometimes via the surgical amputation of healthy body parts. Opponents to the provision of therapeutic healthy-limb amputation in cases of BIID make appeals to the envisioned harms that such an intervention would cause, harms such as the creation of a lifelong physical disability where none existed before. However, this concept of harm is often based on a normative biomedical model of (...) health and disability, a model which conflates amputation with impairment, and impairment with a disability. This article challenges the prima facie harms assumed to be inherent in limb amputation and argues in favour of a potential treatment option for those with BIID. To do this, it employs the social model of disability as a means to separate the concept of impairment and disability and thereby separate the acute and chronic harms of the practice of therapeutic healthy-limb amputation. It will then argue that provided sufficient measures are put in place to ensure that those with atypical bodily constructions are not disadvantaged, the chronic harms of elective amputation would cease to be. (shrink)

In their study, Dasgupta et al. interviewed seven Indian-based experts to gauge their views on using cognitive enhancement (CE) technologies from a low-and-middle-income country perspective. Specif...

The book is philosophical psychology somewhat after the manner of Hume. It contains much helpful phenomenology of thinking, analysis, definitions of basic concepts, the outlines of a theory, and an account of how thinking so conceived can be knowledge. Again like Hume, Price aims to provide an empiricist account, that is, one the basic concepts in which can be "cashed" in terms of experience. Those interested in the problem of intentionality, in particular, should read the book.

Rodger et al argue for the disenhancement of animals intended for xenotransplantation; that is, the transference of tissues or organs from one species to another. The crux of their claim is that the conditions necessary to facilitate xenotransplantation will be hostile to those subjected to them. Thus, to minimise the suffering of living under such conditions, ‘ethically defensible xenotransplantation should entail the use of genetic disenhancement if it becomes possible to do so and if that pain and suffering cannot be (...) eliminated by other means.’1 In other words, if we can eliminate or meaningfully reduce the suffering of animals destined for xenotransplantation by obliterating their experiential capacity and lacking a less contentious method to achieve the same result, we should do so. When isolated, this argument is compelling. Suffering is terrible and should be avoided. Additionally, when we have the option to reduce another’s suffering—be that human, animal or otherwise—there are strong prima facie arguments that we should do so. This point is reinforced when we collectively are responsible for that suffering, as would be the case with xenotransplantation, and it is true regardless of how justified we are in causing that suffering. Thus, on the restrictive terms of Rodger et al ’s argument, I agree with them. We should eliminate, or if not possible, reduce, suffering wherever we can, and this applies to animals too. Having said that, when situated in the xenotransplantation context, issues with their proposal …. (shrink)

This essay responds to four critics of Friends and Other Strangers: Studies in Religion, Ethics and Culture: Diana Fritz Cates, Eric Gregory, Ross Moret, and Atalia Omer. Focusing on the book’s organizing concepts of intimacy and alterity, engagement with empirical sources, discussion of Augustine’s thought, and attention to moral psychology and political morality, these interlocutors take up various strands in the book’s argument and extend them into metaethical, normative, and metadisciplinary domains. The author organizes his response under three rubrics: Metaethics (...) and Personal Relationships; Political Morality; and Multidisciplinary Horizons. (shrink)

This is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 1963, given by Richard B. Brandt (1910-1997), an American philosopher.

This essay critically explores resources and reasons for the study of culture in religious ethics, paying special attention to rhetorics and genres that provide an ethics of ordinary life. I begin by exploring a work in cultural anthropology that poses important questions for comparative and cultural inquiry in an age alert to "otherness," asymmetries of power, the end of value-neutrality in the humanities, and the formation of identity. I deepen my argument by making a foundational case for the importance of (...) culture as a topic of normative analysis through a discussion of the emotions as cultural artifacts. To illustrate how cultural analysis can inform religious ethics, I turn to works by Wayne Meeks, Margaret Trawick, and Charles Taylor. I conclude by sketching some implications of a "cultural turn" for future work in religious ethics. (shrink)

Clouser and Gert’s 'A Critique of Principlism’ (1990) has ignited debate over the adequacy of substituting principlism for moral theory as a means for dealing with biomedical dilemmas. Clouser and Gert argue that this sort of substitution is not adequate to the task. I examine their argument in light of recent defences of principlism on this score, those of B. Andrew Lustig (1992), David Degrazia (1992), and Beauchamp and Childress (1994). I argue that both sides in the debate have assumed (...) differing conceptions of a moral theory that virtually guarantee their respective conclusions. These differing conceptions are motivated by antecedent epistemological commitments. The present debate over principlism is therefore inconclusive. Future discussion should focus on the underlying epistemological issues. (shrink)

In her paper, Robinson asserts that if one is convinced by the arguments assigning personhood according to a threshold criterion, one should also be open to the potential for a secondary personhood threshold, satisfied when one is pregnant, which confers temporary enhanced moral status. Rather than grounding such a claim on a fetus’s possession, or lack thereof, of personhood, Robinson argues that the pregnant person’s status as a ‘unique being’ is enough to satisfy the requirements of such an additional personhood (...) classification. 1 She justifies her claim via three arguments: (1) that the pregnant person is, in fact, more than a singular individual; (2) that pregnant people play a critical role in the human race’s continuation and (3) that the significant harms and burdens to which pregnant people have been exposed to historically and contemporary requires counterbalancing with enhanced protections. Unfortunately, despite Robinson’s best efforts, she does not... (shrink)